

**Intermittently transmitting warning signals from the outermost rim**









I had composed a long reply to Joseph's comment on the excerpt from Werber's piece on Tolkien, but then blogger crashed and I've lost the work as a result. Working briefly from memory, what interested me in putting a tiny selection from the article on this blog was that I thought it raised some interesting questions. Is Werber claiming in Gramscian terms that the hegemony of popular culture, predicated on its notion of "common sense", (tantamount to Joseph's comments about the irreducibility of art to its original contexts of production and dissemination), is threatened by a historic bloc composed of biocultural interests, that works by recuperating "innocent" entertainments such as Tolkien? Or is the irony somewhat greater, that Werber's warnings are themselves the paramnesiac symptom of that which they are trying to disavow i.e. colonisation of common sense by biopolitical discourses?
But doesn't this undecidability prove Gramsci's original point, that what constitutes common sense remains contested in hegemonic struggles? Hence Joseph's preferred option may be credible in its own terms, but ultimately it is unable to indemnify itself against contestation. Moreover, isn't the interesting point, which I tried to raise by posting Werber in the first place, how Nazism has to some extent undergone postmodernisation? While not an empty signifier by any means, it has a "floating" capacity in today's media culture to attach itself to other discourses. By tagging that post as "bioculture", I am really asking why today is this one of the most prominent forms of articulation? Are certain problematiques recurring or would they be better understood as novel? Should we see this "ambivalence" as one of the problems of living our relation to history in our late/post modern times? Dery seemed to be pointing in this direction, which is why I earlier posted his "Why the Nazis Matter Today".
Furthermore, even though I have pointed more to a struggle between discourses, which is implicit in what motivated Werber's calculated reference to "hegemony", even without this, I question whether Joseph's points would withstand close scrutiny, even on their own restrictive terms. Afterall, little support was forthcoming for Bryan Ferry when he earlier this year made his comments about the "beauty" of Nazi aesthetics....In any case, the associated critical imperative to police these boundaries is indissociable from tension, difference, (if not contradiction), and we need to be alert to the blindness of the observer and the subsequent undetected re-entry of the originally exluded term in another guise. I say this because Werber is a student of Luhmann as well, and he would surely be aware of the potential of this contingency to undercut the premises of his own argument. To be consistent though, he would also be appreciative of how they could work to undercut the attempted drawing of distinctions by critical observers such as Joseph.
I think the final point relates to some of the more general issues about "hauntology" that have featured on this blog. Part of what could be extracted from them is an awareness that past, present, and future, cannot be neatly cordoned off from each other (not surprisingly, the notion of a "return of the repressed", even when risking trivialisation or banality in cultural representations of this theme, makes for potent material for a horror themed film. One could consider not only the upcoming Dutch film, "Worst Case Scenario", trailers for which I've posted here, but also precursors such as "Shockwaves"). In other words, I recognise Joseph's critique as characteristic of certain reservations others have expressed about cultural studies, as per, for example, Janet Wolff's and Andrew Goodwin's assessment of one scholar's efforts to contextualise the singer Sam Cooke. For them, the irony is that the scholar can demonstrate, in keeping with the lyrics of Cooke's song a great deal of knowledge about "history" etc, but is apparently unable to explain anything about why he actually "likes" Sam Cooke. This kind of argument thereby works well in its own terms. Where it encounters difficulties though is in accounting for public forms of enquiry, of deciding who can participate, and for whom such distinctions would "work". At issue would be the extent to which post-war generations in Germany feel a responsibility for transparent public disclosure, even if this means engaging with articulations that may be abhorrent or unexpected to them. It was certainly in this spirit that I welcome Joseph's comment, but it is also affirmative of the positive sense I got from travelling in Germany a few years ago. By extension, Werber is arguing that drawing too great a distinction between "the downfall" and what now is, and may be to come, is a notion worthy of critical attention in as many forums as possible.
Who would want to disagree with this democratic imperative, even if they think Werber is drawing some very long bows? I feel we should applaud his principle of public enquiry, whilst recognising its paradoxical effects: by reinscribing its subject within larger frameworks of meaning, it is freed up for other forms of engagement. And which artists or democrats could credibly disagree with that?
Finally, the reference to "symptom" earlier might alert some to Zizek's Lacanian style of cultural analysis: it too would question whether things can be enjoyed simply on the basis of what they appear to be, or whether the enjoyment is really symptomatic of something else. I chose in this post to place Werber closer to Gramsci and Luhmann as it seems like a tighter fit to some of the terms he actually uses, both in that article quoted, and in his other work. There are also demonstrable problems in Zizek's accounting for "common sense", which Andy Robinson documents in the link below.
Baudrillard, Zizek and Laclau on "common sense" - a critique
POST-MARXISM, POST-STRUCTURALISM AND EVERYDAY WORLDVIEWS
http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html


Ruhr University Bochum
I. Race and Space in German Discourses—After the Downfall
"This year, 60 years after the end of the Third Reich, the German public predictably is celebrating the collective reminiscence of this era. The Oscar-nominated German movie The Downfall, with its "human" perspective on high-ranking Nazi "protagonists" and their entourage performing the regime's last act in the "Fuehrerbunker," is playing a significant part in this culture of remembrance. Whereas the protest generation in the 1960s and '70s criticized the hundredfold continuity of Nazi institutions, staff, laws, and ideology, The Downfall is styling the end of the National Socialist dictatorship as an epochal tabula rasa. Whoever outlived the breakdown of the Reich was sentenced in Nuremberg or reeducated under Allied surveillance. Therefore, May 8, 1945, can be seen as Hour Zero, "die Stunde Null." Such a standpoint gets backing from The Downfall, which dramatizes the end of the Third Reich in very suggestive pictures of destruction, annihilation, death, and suicide. Based on the destroyed battlegrounds in the film, the audience may assume that something altogether new would be built. However, in this essay I will investigate which components of the Third Reich have survived the collapse and are still present today.
This interest in a "subliminal" continuity of pre-1945 modes of thinking was enhanced by the tremendous success of John Ronald Reul Tolkien's epic novel The Lord of the Rings on the German book market and the awesome triumph of Peter Jackson's movie adaptation on German movie screens. Both novel and motion picture are obviously obsessed with the differences between certain races (Elves and Numenór, Dwarfs and Hobbits, Orcs and Southrons, Istari and Balrogs), their genealogies, bloodlines, crossbreedings, and even their biogenetic procreation (Uruk-Hai). Their respective realms (pretty Shire, proud Gondor, beautiful Imladris, terrible Mordor) mirror these differences. Through reading Tolkien's novels, seeing the movies, or playing computer games like "The Battle for Middle-earth" (EA Games, 2004), one is introduced into a certain bio- and geopolitical knowledge: first of all, races are different not only in terms of skin color or height, but in moral worth, refinement, wisdom, and political integrity. The races are either hereditarily good and wise like Elves or genetically evil and dumb like Orcs, and therefore they make "natural-born" enemies. The absolute and insurmountable hate between Elves and Orcs is not outlined as a consequence of political decision-making, but as a result of their opposing DNA sequences. To pass off contingent, historical, and changeable political differences as "natural" or "given" oppositions is paradigmatic in discourses of social Darwinism since the mid-nineteenth century. That "the Slavs" were a race hostile to "us" or "France" was "our" sworn enemy were typical phrases in this German context. In Nazi Germany, the construction of a strict difference between "us" and "them" itself was dramatized as threatened through the menace of mingling: "the Jew" was tainting "our" blood in a biogenetic warfare against the body of the German nation. Within the biopolitical discourse, this threat directly provided the justification for an extermination campaign against the Jewish race. Secondly, in a purely geopolitical context, one is taught that the differences between the territories of these races should be considered results of intense interactions between the cultivating nations and their soil. A primary result of this relationship is that the literal ground of a racial war of extermination is not neutral, but partisan. The whole world, including the territories and landscapes, climates and flora, the waters and their tides and currents, the birds and animals—everything is playing its "natural" role in the conflict between the free, noble races of Elves, Men, and their allies, on the one hand, and the "slaves" or "creatures" of evil and their collaborators, on the other hand. The realms, territories, and regions of the different nations have been molded through years of control in such a deep way that they should be counted as important parts of the political and military power of Middle-earth's races. Space and nature are highly politicized, to such a degree that one has to take into account the geopolitical and biopolitical dimensions of Tolkien's world. To view "natural borders" like rivers or mountains as a living periphery of the society and, vice versa, to understand society as a living organism or political body are integral parts of a geopolitical perspective.Thus, a reader of a German geopolitical author, like Carl Schmitt, Karl Haushofer, or Friedrich Ratzel, or a scholar of the discourses of eugenics, breeding, social Darwinism, or racism, either of whom is reading Tolkien's best sellers or viewing Jackson's blockbusters, would easily be convinced of the proposal that he is encountering a world of fiction that could be described best by pre-1945 discourses. It is not only that the analogies between the battle for Middle-earth and the Nazi campaign of racial warfare are striking and not only that some random elements of the Third Reich's politics seem to have survived the "downfall" in the genre of fantasy books, films, and games: rather an analysis of deep structure, narrative logic, rhetoric, and topology in Tolkien's works reveals in terms of geo- and biopolitics an almost frightening coherence.
I do not assert that Tolkien has written his novels in order to reproduce German discourses of race and space, but I would like to argue that a German audience might find a field of differences, models, and arguments in them that was essential to a pre-1945 hegemonic discourse, but fervently is declared dead in the Federal Republic of Germany. The eminent scholar of East European history Karl Schlögel has remarked in his latest book on Geopolitics and the History of Civilizations that the postwar generations have forgotten or repressed everything of the Nazi semantics of space and race, including its long tradition of German political geography. That discourse has completely "vanished in Germany," he claims".
NB: THE PAINTING CHOSEN TO ILLUSTRATE THIS POST:
Judy Chicago - HUC Show Banality of Evil/StruthofAcrylic, Oil & Photography30.24 in x 43.25 inframed