The World Without Us

How 'Political' is Crisis Management?

According to Gelber and Vromen the “political is not only what is done by governments…it is also about the way power is distributed, negotiated and contested in all parts of our lives” (Gelber & Vromen 2005: 317). Drawing some impetus from this observation, if we accept that the division of state and society is an artificial construct, an argument can be readily constructed that crisis and disaster management is an inherently ‘political’ activity. However, this reductionist argument does not provide sufficient explanation of the ‘political’ nature of crisis and disaster management. In the interest therefore of securing a more expansive definition this paper will argue that there are three dominant paradigms that seek to define crisis and disaster management as a form of social construction.

The first paradigm is the dominant functionalist one of crisis and disaster management that presents it as a challenging part of effective governance. The second paradigm is that of the conspiracy theory. The third paradigm is that of the progressive. A critical examination of these paradigms will reveal that they all share a conception of crisis and disaster management being ‘political’, but differ markedly in the repercussions arising from this for the exercise of power. The assassination of President Kennedy, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina will prove of crucial importance in clarifying the respective differential focus of each of the paradigms I have identified.

Turning then to the functionalist paradigm for crisis and disaster management, what is at stake is the identification of ‘political’ activity that must be satisfactorily addressed in order to achieve sound governance. Although the exact definition of crisis and disaster management remains contested in the academy, there remains a broad agreement with respect to the latter that the field is defined by governmental and societal responses to ‘natural’ disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes (Boin 2005: 154). Crisis scholars have a broader field of interest encompassing the identification and official response to the belief that “the core values of a system…have come under threat. It is often assumed that such a threat requires the urgent reaction of leaders” (Boin 2006: 86). Scholars in this field recognise crisis and disaster management to be ‘political’. Boin et al assert “crises are political at heart” (Boin et al 2005: ix).

It can be inferred from Boin et al that this paradigm has a somewhat functionalist character in its emphasis upon system stability (Marshall 1998: 241). Accordingly the normative viewpoint adopted is that of the government and the strategies available to it in order to successfully manage crises and disasters. A key objective is for the state to avoid what Habermas terms a ‘legitimation crisis’, arising from the failure of governmental crisis management (Habermas 1973: 69). As I shall argue, this prioritisation of the reproduction of political power can be fruitfully contrasted with the emphasis on social change entailed by the other paradigms.

The normative character of the functionalist paradigm can be illustrated through consideration of pertinent operational examples. On 22 November 1963, US President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. This event was experienced as a severe national trauma with international repercussions (Brinkley 1999: 1033) requiring urgent and effective crisis management. Vice President Lyndon Johnson was swiftly installed as the new President. In order to minimise perceptions of Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination, which may have heightened international tensions, Johnson appointed a federal commission chaired by Chief Justice Warren to report on the assassination. The commission eventually concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was solely responsible. By individualising the threat to the American state in the form of a lone assassin, the functionalist paradigm could claim by its criterion to have averted a ‘legitimation crisis’ (Dallek 2004: 699).

Another traumatic event for the US was the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 resulting in the deaths of 3,000 people. Part of the governmental crisis management strategy was to request a report from a bipartisan national commission on the question of “how did this happen?”. The 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 detailed the intelligence and security failures that help make the attacks possible, and made extensive recommendations for policy changes aimed at preventing future attacks, notably in administrative, border and immigration policy. The report also attributed responsibility for the attacks to a plot amongst foreign Islamic terrorists (Wikipedia 2006). Under the terms of this paradigm, the commission report could be counted a successful governmental crisis response: witness the widespread acclaim with which it was greeted by not only sectional interests, such as politicians and the media (Boin et al 2005: 114), but also the general public. Many of its recommendations were adopted (Boin et al 2005: 115). It is not surprising then that much of the academic discourse on 9/11 has been framed in terms of the reporting of the commission.

Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in September 2005, was reported as the biggest ‘natural’ disaster in US history, resulting in more than 1500 deaths and nearly 1 million people being made homeless. However, unlike the assassination of President Kennedy and terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US governmental crisis management proved to be, as admitted by President Bush, “inadequate” (Gawenda 2006: 12). Katrina resulted in an ongoing ‘legitimation crisis’ for the Bush administration, with its competence being widely questioned. Consequentially, there has been a sharp decline in Bush’s popular approval. In terms of this disaster the functionalist paradigm has steadfastly focused on the failed emergency response and instrumentalist means for improving it in future (Gawenda 2006: 12).

Regarding the functionalist paradigm as seeking only to preserve its own interests at the expense of the greater good, its more populist opponents have chosen to disregard the imputed categorical separation between crisis and disaster (Smith, Denis 2006: 8). Attempting to indicate the conceptual incoherence that can result from this critical move, journalist Christopher Hitchens has characterised the conspiracy theory paradigm as “the white noise which moves in to fill the vacuity of the official version” (Hitchens 1993: 14 cited in Fenster 1999: xiv). By the same token, Hitchens would concede the possible identification of one overarching component: populist conspiracism is concerned with what it regards as the power of ruling elites over all aspects of political and social life. Hence, for conspiracy theorists the true nature of power (ie those controlling government) is hidden and only discernible by those aware of the conspiracy. Which is to say, power is most commonly explained by conspiracy theorists in terms of the secret control exercised by various social, ethnic or even supernatural elites in pursuit of their own nefarious ends (Fenster 1999: xiv). Conspiracism is critical of the existing political order and yearns for a new order based on (largely undefined) transparency and goodness (Fenster 1999: 225). In this regard, it might be said, along with Hitchens, that the paradigm fails to articulate an agenda for moving from plot detection to transformative political movement (Fenster 1999: 226).

It is demonstrably the case that under the conspiracy theory paradigm crisis and disaster management is a very different type of ‘political’ activity to that conceptualised in the functionalist paradigm. Typically crises and disasters are interpreted by conspiracy theorists for their ‘secret’ meaning, ie, what machinations of the power elite they reveal. Hence the representative examples selected for the functionalist paradigm serve equally well to illustrate that of the conspiracy theory.

Consider how speculation about the Kennedy assassination has come to embody the conspiracy theory paradigm in light of the fact that the majority of the American people have rejected the findings of the Warren Commission as demonstrated in opinion polling (Dallek 2004: 698). Conspiracy theories have nominated disparate elements from international (Cuba, Vietnam, the USSR) to the domestic (mafia, military industrial complex, Lyndon Johnson) as being behind the assassination (Dallek 2004: 699). Each of these theories have conceptualised the assassination as a ‘political’ act that involved the hidden play of power.

In spite of the wider credibility of the 9/11 Commission Report, conspiracy theories have vigorously sought to challenge its findings. In a complete inversion of the official enquiry, some conspiracists have maintained that the attacks were ‘facilitated’ by the Bush administration and government agencies. In some versions of this theory the ‘facilitation’ took the form of a deliberate failure by the administration to prevent them. In others the ‘facilitation’ involved the Bush administration actually planning and executing the attacks to further its own agenda (Griffin 2005: 5).

Amongst the African-American communities devastated by Hurricane Katrina, the governmental crisis disaster management response was conceptualised in far more sinister terms than “inadequate”. Conspiracy theories have gained wide currency by appealing to the sense of neglect and victimhood common to those most affected by this tragedy. They allege that government officials, in order to flood out black and poor neighbourhoods, deliberately smashed the levees. Lack of government progress in rebuilding these neighbourhoods is considered to be indicative of the continuing nature of the conspiracy (Gawenda 2006: 12).

The progressive paradigm articulates a radically differing version of crisis and disaster management as a ‘political’ activity to that offered by its populist relative. It does share with the conspiracy theory paradigm a critical attitude to the existing political order and a yearning for a better one. This paradigm also shares the critical attitude that crisis and disaster management is reflective of the interests of the power elites behind the state. However, what differentiates it from the conspiracy paradigm are three constitutive features. Firstly, its political analytical focus is upon institutional, structural or systemic phenomena, rather than the secretive machinations of elite individuals or groups (Fenster 1999: 57). Secondly, its epistemological approach is more rigorously scholarly in drawing upon verifiable documentation of the impact of institutional structures on political activity. Finally, its analysis is intended to lead to progressive political activity to deal with structural inequality, whereas conspiracy theorists engage in disempowering scapegoating of individuals (Fenster 1999: 58). How this paradigm differs from the other two is made apparent through consideration of its interpretation of the Kennedy assassination, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.

Conspiracy theories linking the assassination of President Kennedy with his perceived desire to pull out of Vietnam have been critically analysed by the dissident intellectual Noam Chomsky. Chomsky couches his argument in the terms of the progressive paradigm here identified:

“The available facts, as usual, lead us to seek the institutional sources of policy decisions and their stability…People who wish to understand and change the world will do well…to pay attention to it, not to engage in groundless speculation as to what one or another leader might have done” (Chomsky 1993: 38 cited in Fenster 1999: 57).

Chomsky points out that the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration was consistent with the Cold War policy pursued by his predecessors and successors (Chomsky 1993: 38 cited in Fenster 1999: 58). Under this paradigm the assassination of Kennedy was a ‘political’ act but effective systemic crisis and disaster management ensured it did not lead to radical systemic change.

Likewise Chomsky deploys a progressive argument concerning the events of 9/11: “A terrible atrocity, but unless you’re in Europe or the United States…you know it’s nothing new. That’s the way the imperial powers have treated the rest of the world for hundreds of years….If you’re interested in preventing them, of course you’ll pay attention to the reasons” (Chomsky 2003: 15). By this logic, effective crisis and disaster management would entail progressive, fundamental, change to American foreign policy and the interests it serves rather than what is proposed under either the functionalist or conspiracy theory paradigms.

The incompetence of the crisis and disaster management response to Katrina has been widely acknowledged. Under the functionalist paradigm this has tended to focus on criticism of the Bush administration and local authorities; criticism that for conspiracy theorists must be extended to include examination of ulterior motivations. Neil Smith distinguishes himself by articulating a progressive interpretation: “It is not a radical conclusion that the dimensions of the Katrina disaster owe in large part not just to the actions of this or that local or federal administration but the operation of a capitalist market more broadly, especially in its neo-liberal garb” (Smith, Neil 2006). He proposes that the victims should decide how ‘reconstruction’ proceeds in New Orleans and that the billions raised for disaster relief also rightfully belongs to them (Smith, Neil 2006). Systemic change to benefit the victims is central to this vision of crisis and disaster management as a ‘political’ activity.

Although crisis and disaster management can be understood as ‘political’ activity under each of the interpretive paradigms analysed here, I have argued in this paper that it is necessary to highlight the substantive political activity. Political activity is framed under the functionalist paradigm as a technical matter, in terms of what strategies are available to government and civil society to deal with systemic disruptions. The other two paradigms present an even more ‘political’ conception of crisis and disaster management in their focus upon the fundamental nature of power it reveals to them. The similarities though are somewhat deceptive. Whereas the conspiracy theory fails to articulate a sound critical strategy for analaysis or ultimate political action, the progressive perspective provides the most ‘political’ characterisation by insisting that crisis and disaster management has to be based upon critical, scholarly, structural analysis. Of paramount importance to a progressive perspective is finding ways of reconstructing the systemic inequities that lie behind crises and disasters. These differences should by now be apparent in light of the differing interpretations of the Kennedy assassination, 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina favoured by each of the three paradigms in question.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boin, A., t’Hart, P., Stern, E. & Sundelius, B. (2005), The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boin, A. (2006), ‘Organizations and Crisis: The Emergence of a Research Paradigm’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).

Brinkley, A. (1999), American History A Survey Volume II: Since 1865, New York: McGraw-Hill College.

Chomsky, N. (1993), Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture, Boston: South End Press.

Chomsky, N. (2003), Power and Terror: Post-9/11 Talks and Interviews, New York: Seven Stories Press.

Dallek, R. (2004), John F. Kennedy: An Unfinished Life, London: Penguin.

Fenster, M. (1999), Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, Minneapolis: The University of Minneapolis Press.

Gawenda, M. (2006), ‘Katrina Goes To Washington’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 August 2006, p.12.

Gelber, K. & Vromen, A. (2005), Powerscape: Contemporary Australian Political Practice, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Griffin, D. R. (2005), The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, Northampton: Olive Branch Press.

Habermans, J. (1973), Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Press.

Hitchens, C. (1993), For the Sake of Argument, London: Verso.

Marshall, G. (1998), Dictionary of Sociology (second edn.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, D. (2006), ‘Crisis Management – Practice in Search of a Paradigm’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).

Smith, N. (2005), ‘There’s No Such Thing As A Natural Disaster’, Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social
Sciences, http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Smith/ , accessed 28 October, 2006.

Wikipedia (2006), ‘The 9/11 Commission Report’, Wikipedia online encyclopedia, http://www.wikipedia.com/, accessed 27 October, 2006.

Assesssing the 1993 Waco Siege

This paper seeks to assess the effectiveness of the crisis response by the US federal government at Waco. Waco was the greatest disaster in the history of US federal law enforcement (Lynch 2001). It resulted in the largest number of deaths of federal law enforcement officers in an official operation, and the greatest number of civilian deaths resulting from such an operation (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 16). The failure of the crisis response to achieve its operational goals is attributable to faulty sense and decision making. The poor quality of the sense and decision making will be explained via reference to Rodney King syndrome, groupthink, organizational identity and high reliability organisations. The only positive aspect of the crisis response was the double-loop learning it induced amongst federal law enforcement. Operational examples will be integral to this assessment which reveal it to be part of a chain of interdependent events.

On February 28, 1993, 100 agents of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) arrived at the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas, with a warrant to search for illegal guns and to arrest the Davidians’ leader David Koresh. A 45-minute gun battle ensued resulting in the deaths of four ATF agents and five Davidians with sixteen agents injured as well as a number of the Davidians (McCarthy 1993: 17). Subsequently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assumed operational responsibility from the BATF at Waco. The FBI then maintained a 51-day siege of the Davidians, which ended on April 19, 1993, when they stormed the compound building lobbing tear gas canisters in and bulldozing it. A fire broke out which consumed the building. Eighty-nine Davidians were killed, including Koresh and twenty-five children (Blumenthal 2003: 54). There were only nine survivors (Clinton 2004: 499).

In terms of its law enforcement objectives the government crisis response has to be classified as a failure. The BATF brief was to execute a modest warrant to arrest Koresh and search the Davidian premises for illegal guns. There were viable non-violent options available for achieving this, which the BATF chose to ignore. Koresh could have been arrested outside the property as he visited an auto repair shop, junkyard and on a weekly basis a local diner during February 1993 (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 80). Koresh also had a history of complying with requests from government officials. In 1987 he had peacefully submitted to arrest and seizure of his guns (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 91) and he had allowed an official of the Texas Department of Child Protective Services to search the Davidian property on two occasions – without a warrant in 1992 (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 92).

Instead of pursuing the non-violent options of seeking to arrest Koresh outside the compound or to enlist his co-operation, the BATF and FBI both opted for military-style raids resulting in much loss of life. The BATF raid of 28 February, 1993, created an operational crisis. The FBI raid on April 19, 1993, brought this operational crisis to an end, but created a political crisis in the process owing to the further tragic loss of life involved. The political crisis dragged on for years and included official investigations and legal proceedings (Boin et al 2005: 98). It wasn’t until July 2000, when John Danforth (a former Republican senator), acting in his capacity of special counsel for the Department of Justice, issued an investigatory report, in which the government was exonerated of all charges of responsibility for the deaths at Waco (Blumenthal 2003: 54). Attorney General Reno, who authorised the FBI raid, admitted in 1994, “Obviously, I saw what happened, and knowing what had happened, I wouldn’t do it again” (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 292). President Clinton confessed in 2000 to having made a “terrible mistake” in allowing the FBI raid to proceed and that he felt “personally responsible for what happened” (Herbeck & Michel 2004: 380).

The ineffective crisis response needs to be understood as a failure of sense and decision making. This will be explained via reference to the conceptual tools of Rodney King syndrome, groupthink, organizational identity and high reliability organisations.

Vance McLaughlin and Steve Smith offer one explanation for this erroneous sense and decision making. They use Waco to illustrate what they term Rodney King syndrome: law enforcement officials always desiring to be in control of any situation. When they fail to bring an unusual suspect under control using approved tactics and techniques officials tend to become frustrated, angry, and ultimately violent. One justified the FBI raid on the basis that, “These people had thumbed their noses at law enforcement” (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 165). Part of the justification given for the planned raid by Reno to Clinton was that, “the FBI was tired of waiting” (Clinton 2004: 498). They had mounted a 51-day siege which they feared left them appearing ineffective and not in control of the situation (Gibbs 1993: 41). The FBI also wanted a redemptive “victory” over the Davidians to avenge the deaths of the four BATF agents (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 211).

Groupthink refers to extreme agreement seeking amongst members of elite groups. Groups afflicted by this tendency generally have unrealistic expectations as to their ability to prevail in a crisis (Boin et al 2005: 47). In t’Hart’s opinion, groupthink is notably prevalent in “the repressive and military parts of the state apparatus” (t’Hart 1990: 156). Another characteristic of groupthink noted by t’Hart is, “the tendency to become entrapped in a spiral of ineffective policies.” (t’Hart 1990: 280) as groupthink often leads the members of the elite group to value their group above everything else. Elite groups also tend to ignore risks, which affect only the stereotyped outgroup (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 211). All of these groupthink characteristics were present amongst the federal law enforcement officials at Waco and helps to explain their “ineffective policies”. For example, the FBI held much false optimism regarding the chances of success of their planned high-risk paramilitary raid, in spite of the disastrous failure of the BATF raid. Groupthinking was also apparent in the BATF indifference to the risks their raid would pose to the ‘stereotyped outgroup’, ie, the Davidians. The 1993 internal Treasury investigation into BATF conduct at Waco found that in planning the raid the BATF showed little or no concern about the likelihood of civilian casualties. In fact, one official memo revealed that BATF recognized that “casualties are probable” (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 81).

Mitroff and Pauchant in their study of the crisis management capacity of healthy and unhealthy companies, concluded that the fundamental difference between such companies lay in their organizational identity. Unhealthy companies are labelled ‘self-inflated corporations’ and are characterised by their narcissistic nature (Mitroff & Pauchant 2006: 138). They consider a crisis to be something that happens primarily to them (Mitroff & Pauchant 2006: 139) rather than to clients or the environment. ‘Positive self-regard corporations’ are exactly the opposite. The characteristics of the ‘self-inflated corporation’ are readily identifiable in the policy decisions of the BATF and FBI during the Waco crisis. For example, in the reasons offered by the FBI to Reno to justify the raid (which she had to authorise) the FBI appeared to be overly concerned with the impact of the crisis on their own organisation. These included “the FBI was tired of waiting; that the standoff was costing the government a million dollars a week and tying up law-enforcement resources needed elsewhere” (Clinton 2004: 498). It is also apparent in the BATF determination to go ahead with their raid despite the fact “casualties are probable” (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 81).

Boin, McConnell, and t’Hart argue that: “high reliability organisations (HROs) have a particularly well-developed capacity for lesson-drawing…Their systems and cultures are ingrained with the pre-emption of errors, systematic adjustments, learning in the event of tragedy, and a deeper ‘deutero’ learning i.e. learning how to learn…” (Boin, McConnell & t’Hart 2006: 16). Unfortunately, the BATF and FBI in 1993 did not qualify as HROs. They had not learnt from previous tragedies of a comparable nature to Waco, which occurred in Philadelphia, Arkansas and Ruby Ridge.

On May 13, 1985, the Philadelphia police bombed the communal home of the MOVE sect after an earlier attempt by a large group of police to serve arrest warrants there resulted in a gun battle. Eleven members of the cult died as a result of the bombing; there were only two survivors. An official city investigation into the incident concluded, “Dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was unconscionable” (Wikipedia 2006) $32 million in compensation has been paid to the victims’ families (Wikipedia 2006).

During Clinton’s tenure as governor of Arkansas a right-wing extremist group had established an well-armed and secure compound in the mountainous north of the state. Amongst the residents were two murder suspects. The FBI asked Governor Clinton for permission to storm the compound. He refused permission after obtaining a situational assessment from a Vietnam veteran who informed him that at least fifty agents would be killed in such a raid. Instead Clinton ordered the compound be put under a state of siege and blockade to prevent anyone leaving or supplies getting in. The group (including the murder suspects) ultimately surrendered with no loss of life. To Clinton’s later regret, he allowed himself to be persuaded by the FBI arguments for their planned Waco raid, rather than insist they adopt a policy of action based on the example of Arkansas (Clinton 2004: 498).

The most egregious example of federal law-enforcement failure to engage in lesson-drawing is provided by the 1992 incident at a cabin in Ruby Ridge, northern Idaho. Randall Weaver was a white supremacist who had been indicted for selling illegal shotguns. After failing to appear in court he holed up with his family at his home. On 21 August 1992, three federal marshals surveying the Weaver property ran into Weaver’s son Samuel and friend Kevin Harris. A gunfight ensued which left one marshal and Samuel Weaver dead. The FBI then laid siege to the Weaver cabin for the next 10 days. An FBI sniper shot and killed Randy’s wife and wounded Randy and Harris. Harris, Weaver and his three daughters finally surrendered after talking with an independent negotiator (Tharp 1993: 33). Weaver and Harris were ultimately acquitted of murder and conspiracy and the Weaver family was paid $3.1 million in compensation by the federal Justice Department (Walter 1995: 453). Richard Rogers, FBI tactical commander at Waco, also served at Ruby Ridge, as did senior FBI officials Larry Potts, Danny Coulson and Michael Kahoe who acted as advisers to Reno on Waco (Lynch 2001). It seems that Rogers, Potts, Coulson, and Kahoe had all failed to take any lesson-drawing from the botched operation at Ruby Ridge.

According to Miglani et al “Crises are composed of many loosely coupled interdependent events often taking place in geographically dispersed locations and at different times. Each event sets the stage for others to occur in a chain reaction that proliferates the crisis” (Miglani et al 2006: 36). This critical insight is of assistance in achieving contextual understanding of the crisis response at Waco. Waco needs to be understood as the culmination of the violent, military style of law enforcement all too often favoured as a crisis response by the American authorities; particularly the FBI. This was apparent in Philadelphia, Arkansas and Ruby Ridge leading up to Waco.

The failure of law enforcement to engage in lesson-drawing resulted in another tragic interdependent event at Oklahoma City. On April 19, 1995, the federal building there was blown up with the loss of one hundred and sixty eight lives. Timothy McVeigh, the principal bomber, justified his actions in writing to Gore Vidal: “Foremost, the bombing was a retaliatory strike: a counter-attack, for the cumulative raids (and subsequent violence and damage) that federal agents had participated in over the preceding years (including, but not limited to, Waco)” (Vidal 2002: 290).

The failed operational response at Waco had a “paradigm-shattering” quality (Boin et al 2005: 121) which finally stimulated double-loop learning in federal law enforcement. This involved setting “new priorities and weightings of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves together with associated strategies and assumptions (Boin et al 2005: 121). The learning process began at the top and continued down to middle-level and street-level bureaucrats.

In July 1993, for example, President Clinton dismissed the director of the FBI, William Sessions because of dissatisfaction with his performance, particularly at Waco (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 237). When Clinton interviewed Louis Freeh for the job he asked him what he thought of the FBI claim that they had to proceed with the raid because it was “wrong” to keep so many resources invested in the one operation over a prolonged period. Freeh replied “They get paid to wait” (Clinton 2004: 530). Clinton subsequently appointed Freeh. Richard Rogers, FBI tactical commander at both Waco and Ruby Ridge, was also replaced in late 1993 (Blackman & Kopel 1997: 236).

The profundity and success of the learning experience was shown by how the FBI next handled a situation similar to Waco. In 1996 the FBI laid siege to a militia group, the Montana Freemen, at their compound in Jordan, Montana, who were wanted over tax fraud and harassment charges. The siege lasted eighty-one days and ended peacefully with the negotiated surrender of the Freemen. The estimated cost for the operation was $50 million and although a significant drain on FBI resources for nearly three months, priority was given to avoiding loss of life, unlike at Waco. No requests were submitted for permission to storm the compound. FBI behaviour was more befitting a ‘positive self-regard corporation’ than a ‘self-inflated corporation’.

Crucially, the learning process extended to the middle-level and street-level bureaucrats whose behaviour determines the outcome of law enforcement policies (Boin et al 2005: 126). They were aware that TV images of BATF and FBI agents storming the Davidian compound at Waco had led to negative perceptions of them; the National Rifle Association had labelled them “jack-booted government thugs” (Fenster 1999: 34). These perceptions had culminated in the Oklahoma City bombing (Herbeck & Michel 2001: 379). Instead of wearing the Kevlar helmets and black uniforms of Waco that were befitting of “the repressive and military parts of the state apparatus” (t’Hart 1990: 156), at Jordan the FBI were wearing casual clothes. Government armoured vehicles were noticeable by their absence. At Waco FBI agents had to endure the 51-day siege without relief. In Jordan agents were rotated after no more than two weeks (Jakes, Jakes & Richmond 1998: 259). The FBI offered repeated assurances through the media that no assault would be made on the compound. Due care was taken to avoid provocation of the Freemen (Jakes, Jakes & Richmond 1998: 266).

The crisis response of federal law enforcement agencies at Waco cannot be considered effective. The modest operational objective was to execute a warrant to search for illegal guns and to arrest the Branch Davidian leader David Koresh. He had a history of co-operation with law enforcement officials and left the Davidian compound on a number of occasions in February 1993. Nonetheless, the BATF chose to attempt a military-style raid, which failed. After a seven-week siege, the FBI decided to repeat the earlier mistaken strategy of the BATF, and again raid the compound. This resulted in even greater loss of life and the creation of a political crisis. Understanding this ineffective crisis response requires application of the conceptual tools of Rodney King syndrome, groupthink, organizational identity and high reliability organisations. This reveals that the worst features of these concepts were present amongst the law enforcement officials at Waco and serves to explain their very poor sense and decision making during the crisis. Indeed, Waco must be understood as part of a chain of interdependent events such as the disastrous raid at Ruby Ridge, which resulted from the same sort of sub-optimal sense and decision making processes which, in turn, helped foster further crises, in particular, the bombing at Oklahoma City.

These connections eventually came to be recognised by federal agencies, prompting them to undertake a process of double loop learning. As such, the only positive that can be derived from the Waco crisis response is that it did ultimately lead to the adoption of improved response policies and practices as revealed in the successful avoidance of any repeat of Waco. A pertinent operational example is provided by the peaceful resolution of a similar crisis to Waco that occurred three years later at Jordan, Montana.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blackman, P. H. & Kopel, D. B. (1997), No More Wacos: What’s Wrong with Federal Law Enforcement and How to Fix It, Amherst: Prometheus Books.

Blumenthal, S. (2003), The Clinton Wars: An Insider’s Account of the White House Years, Melbourne: Viking.

Boin, A., t’Hart, P., Stern, E. & Sundelius, B. (2005), The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boin, A., McConnell, A., & t’Hart, P. (2006), ‘Crisis Politics: How It Affects Public Leaders, Policies and Institutions’, work in progress posted on Paul t’Hart ANU website, http://polsc.anu.edu.au/staff/hart/pubs.htm, accessed 11 September 2006.

Clinton, B. (2004), My Life, London: Hutchinson Books.

Fenster, M. (1999), Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, Minneapolis: The University of Minneapolis Press.

Gibbs, N. (1993), ‘Fire Storm in Waco’, Time, 3 May 1993, pp.22-41.

Herbeck, D. & Michel, L. (2001), American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & the Oklahoma City Bombing, New York: HarperCollins.

Jakes, C., Jakes, D. & Richmond, C. (1998), False Prophets: The Firsthand Account of a Husband-Wife Team Working for the FBI and Living in Deepest Cover with the Montana Freemen, Los Angeles: Dove Books.

Lynch, T. (2001), ‘No Confidence: An Unofficial Account of the Waco Incident’, The Cato Institute: Policy Analysis No.395 (online), 9 April 2001, available from http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-395es.html (accessed 12 September 2006).

McCarthy, P. (1993), ‘Apocalypse Vow’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 April 1993, p.17.

Migliani, A., Miller, D., Mitroff, I. I. & Shrivastava, P. (2006), ‘Understanding Industrial Crises’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).

Mitroff, I. I. & Pauchant, T. C. (2006), ‘Crisis Prone Versus Crisis Avoiding Organizations: Is Your Company’s Culture Its Own Worst Enemy In Creating Crises?’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).

t’Hart, P. (1990), Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure, Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger.

Tharp, M. (1993), ‘Case Study: Echoes of the Texas Tragedy’, U.S. News & World Report, 3 May 1993, p.33.

Vidal, G. (2002), The Last Empire: Essay 1992-2001, London: Abacus Books.

Walter, J. (1996), Every Knee Shall Bow: The Truth and Tragedy of Ruby Ridge and the Randy Weaver Family, New York: HarperCollins.

Wikipedia (2006), ‘MOVE’, Wikipedia online encyclopedia, http://www.wikipedia.com/, accessed 21 September, 2006.

The meaning of the Oklahoma City Bombing

On April 19, 1995, the worst act of terrorist violence ever perpetrated by American citizens in their own country took place. At 9.02 A. M., the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was devastated by the explosion of an oil-and-fertiliser bomb located in a Ryder truck parked outside. The explosion killed one hundred and sixty eight people and injured more than five hundred people (Herbeck and Michel 2001: xi). Denis Smith considers that crises can be the product of a terrorist attack (Smith 2006: 6) and the Oklahoma City bombing will be treated as such. There have been conflicting attempts to frame the meaning of this crisis. Its portrayal by the American media changed with developments in the crisis. Despite cautionary pleas from the government the media initially chose to portray the crisis as being brought about by foreign, Islamic terrorists. Ultimately the media coverage came to be dominated by the counter-frame presented by the government leader President Clinton. This can be largely attributed to his public communication ability.

Boin et al have opined that in ambiguous crisis situations people’s expectations colour what they perceive to be happening. They point out that in the confused immediate aftermath of the bombing many people erroneously assumed that a conspiracy of Islamic terrorists were behind it (Boin et al. 2005: 31). This was reflected in the mainstream media coverage of the crisis. It was commonly asserted in the media that the bombing had been carried out by Muslim terrorists. Editorials called for military action. The Boston Herald editorial of 20 April, 1995, called for “a bombing campaign of such ferocity that the guilty country is rendered militarily helpless” (Linenthal 2001: 244). On the day of the bombing TV host Connie Chung claimed that “U.S. government sources told CBS news that it has Middle East terrorism written all over it” (Linenthal 2001: 18). Various terrorism “experts” were quoted in the media offering similar opinions such as the former CIA director William Webster. Talk radio shows were highly inflammatory in their language concerning the threat posed by Muslims. For example, the Bob Grant Show declared “we’re going to have more bombings, and we can’t stop it, because these people…it’s a violent religion” (Linenthal 2001: 18). There were a number of violent incidents directed against Muslim Americans around the country in the first few days after the bombing including physical assaults and vandalising of mosques (Linenthal 2001: 18).

Initially the government engaged in the form of impression management that Boin et al term “masking” (Boin et al. 2005: 87), ie, they were not revealing all operational details whilst they tried to ascertain the perpetrators. The only counter-frame offered was to warn that it was too early to blame Islamic terrorists. President Clinton (Clinton 2004: 651) and Oklahoma governor Frank Keating both issued public statements to this effect. These did little to dampen media enthusiasm for framing the crisis as the product of Islamic terrorism (Linenthal 2001: 19).

The framing debate around the crisis dramatically changed on 21 April, 1995, with the FBI arrest and charging of two white Americans (Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols) in connection with the bombing. The media then changed their framing of the crisis from it being the result of a conspiracy between Islamic terrorists to it arising from a conspiracy amongst the right-wing domestic militia movement (Fenster 1999: 228). McVeigh and Nichols were portrayed as reactionary terrorists operating in collusion with the militias who were considered to constitute a “post-Vietnam American Freikorps” (Linenthal 2001: 24). The Omaha World Herald claimed that the militias were “dark forces on the far edges of society….A tiny minority, still a lunatic fringe group” (Linenthal 2001: 24) Vogue characterised militia membership thus “In the best case scenario these guys vote for David Duke or buy ‘the truth about Waco’ videos at militia meetings: in the worst (Linenthal 2001: 24), you get guys holed up in the Ozarks with tanks plotting to overthrow the government and kill all the Jews” (Linenthal 2001: 25). Time magazine of 8 May, 1995, opined that the bombing happened at the “delusional margins” (Linenthal 2001: 20).

Statements from representatives of the movement assisted negative media framing of the militia movement. Although they strongly denied involvement in the bombing they damaged their credibility by also claiming that a governmental conspiracy was actually behind the bombing (Linenthal 2001: 25). Linda Thompson, of the Disorganized Militia of the U.S.A., stated, “I definitely believe the government did the bombing. I mean who’s got a track record of killing children?” (Hamilton 1996: 44) Frank Smith of the Georgia Militia commented “We expected them to do something drastic. We didn’t expect it to be that drastic” (Hamilton 1996: 44). Even more bizarrely Norm Olson, “Commander” of the Michigan Militia (the nation’s largest), asserted that the Japanese government had carried out the bombing in revenge for the American government carrying out the poison gas attack in Tokyo on March 20, 1995 (Fenster 1999: 28).

The revised media framing enhanced the crisis credibility of President Clinton. Credibility is recognised as a crucial factor in crisis communication (Boin et al 2005: 78). Clinton had enhanced his by offering a different message to the media coverage. He had warned that Muslim terrorists were not necessarily responsible at a time the media was framing them as the culprits. The subsequent arrest of McVeigh and Nicholls vindicated his counter-frame.

President Clinton’s adroit handling of crisis communication enabled him to transform his political fortunes. They were at their lowest ebb when the crisis hit. The 1994 congressional elections had led to the opposition conservative Republican party establishing firm majorities in both houses of the US Congress which left the Democratic President Clinton beleaguered and unpopular (Brinkley 1999: 1134). Rituals are a vital part of crisis communication (Boin et al 2005: 84) particularly for an American president. For example, Ronald Reagan’s presidential stature increased after his impressive handling of the role of “mourner-in-chief” (Walker 1996: 338) for the Challenger crew. When Clinton successfully assumed the same role at the national day of mourning in Oklahoma City on 23 April, 1995, his presidential stature was also enhanced (Walker 1996: 338). His subsequent public speeches and appearances were credited with offering further solace to a nation profoundly disturbed by the crisis (Clarke 2004: 97).

Having further bolstered his credibility by impressively carrying out his “sacerdotal duty” (Walker 1996: 338) Clinton was in a position to transform the framing into a “agenda-setting” crisis with a “frame-breaking” aspect (Boin et al 2005: 96). U.S. political dialogue had come to be dominated by right-wing anti-government rhetoric, much of it directed at Clinton. In its most virulent form it came from popular radio talkshow hosts such as Rush Limbaugh. Post-Oklahoma City much of this rhetoric now carried an ugly resonance. Republicans now found themselves wary of being associated with the radical right in the same way that Democrats had been concerned about the radical left in the 1970s (Walker 1996: 338). Clinton sought to expand his counter-frame in order to exploit this political opportunity. Notably, this would allow him to take the high moral ground in criticising his most fervent media opponents. In his words, “For the next few weeks, in addition to hammering away at those who condoned violence, I asked all Americans, including radio talk-show hosts, to weigh their words more carefully, to make sure they did not encourage violence…” (Clinton 2004: 654).

He succeeded in influencing the mainstream media. Harper’s posited that mainstream conservatism helped “legitimate the world view of the Oklahoma City bombers” (Linenthal 2001: 35). The New Yorker mused on 8 May, 1995, “The point…isn’t that Limbaugh or…caused the killing. It is that they never seemed to have given a moment’s thought, as they addressed their audiences, to the consequences of stuffing so much flammable resentment into such tiny bottles” (Linenthal 2001: 35). Later Clinton reflected with satisfaction, “The haters and extremists didn’t go away, but they were on the defensive and…would never quite regain the position they had enjoyed before Timothy McVeigh” (Clinton 2004: 654). Clinton’s skilled handling of the Oklahoma City crisis began his political comeback, which culminated in his landslide reelection victory in 1996 (Walker 1996: 338).

The “agenda-setting” crisis with a “frame-breaking” quality also had a legislative aspect. In March 1995 Clinton had submitted to Congress anti-terrorism legislation that included provision for one thousand additional federal staff, a new FBI counterterrorism operational centre, and legal approval for military experts to be involved in handling domestic terrorism issues (Clinton 2004: 651). It was designed as a government response to the World Trade Centre bombing of 1993. The legislation was controversial because it expanded federal surveillance powers and it generated intense debate (Linenthal 2001: 30). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was signed into law on 24 April, 1996, by Clinton. Its successful passage into law can be attributed to Oklahoma City serving as a symbol or risk and the need to combat the nation’s perceived vulnerability to terrorism. It had stalled in Congress up until that time and had looked unlikely to pass (Fenster 1999: 36).

The Oklahoma City bombing serves as an instructive example of crisis framing. In the confused, immediate aftermath of the attack erroneous expectations of the involvement of Islamic terrorists defined the frame of the event presented by domestic media. The modest counter-frame presented by government leaders, President Clinton and Governor Keating, questioning this assumption did not unduly influence media coverage. However, the subsequent arrest of McVeigh and Nicholls two days after the bombing fundamentally altered the framing of the crisis. The media framing changed to blaming American right-wing extremists. The framing of the government leader President Clinton also changed. With his credibility enhanced by his cautionary initial counter-frame and his performance as “mourner-in-chief” Clinton was able to reframe the crisis to criticise his political opponents and call for greater government resources to combat terrorism. The success of this strategy is reflected in much of the media adopting this approach and the Congressional passage of Clinton’s antiterrorism legislation. The ultimate
lesson of Oklahoma City seems to be that a crisis brought on by a terrorist event presents great political opportunities for leaders with the communication skills to frame it in accordance with their own agenda.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boin, A., t’Hart, P., Stern, E. and Sundelius, B. (2005), The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brinkley, A. (1999), American History: A Survey, Volume II: Since 1865, (tenth ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill College.

Clarke, R. (2004), Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, New York: Free Press.

Clinton, B. (2004), My Life, London: Hutchinson Books.

Fenster, M. (1999), Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, Minneapolis: The University of Minneapolis Press.

Hamilton, N. A. (1996), Militias in America: A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc.

Herbeck, D. and Michel, L. (2001), American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & The Oklahoma City Bombing, New York: Regan Books.

Linenthal, E. T. (2001), The Unfinished Bombing: Oklahoma City in American Memory, New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, D. (2006), ‘Crisis Management – Practice in Search of a Paradigm’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).

Walker, M. (1996), Clinton: The President They Deserve, London: Fourth Estate Limited.