The meaning of the Oklahoma City Bombing

On April 19, 1995, the worst act of terrorist violence ever perpetrated by American citizens in their own country took place. At 9.02 A. M., the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was devastated by the explosion of an oil-and-fertiliser bomb located in a Ryder truck parked outside. The explosion killed one hundred and sixty eight people and injured more than five hundred people (Herbeck and Michel 2001: xi). Denis Smith considers that crises can be the product of a terrorist attack (Smith 2006: 6) and the Oklahoma City bombing will be treated as such. There have been conflicting attempts to frame the meaning of this crisis. Its portrayal by the American media changed with developments in the crisis. Despite cautionary pleas from the government the media initially chose to portray the crisis as being brought about by foreign, Islamic terrorists. Ultimately the media coverage came to be dominated by the counter-frame presented by the government leader President Clinton. This can be largely attributed to his public communication ability.

Boin et al have opined that in ambiguous crisis situations people’s expectations colour what they perceive to be happening. They point out that in the confused immediate aftermath of the bombing many people erroneously assumed that a conspiracy of Islamic terrorists were behind it (Boin et al. 2005: 31). This was reflected in the mainstream media coverage of the crisis. It was commonly asserted in the media that the bombing had been carried out by Muslim terrorists. Editorials called for military action. The Boston Herald editorial of 20 April, 1995, called for “a bombing campaign of such ferocity that the guilty country is rendered militarily helpless” (Linenthal 2001: 244). On the day of the bombing TV host Connie Chung claimed that “U.S. government sources told CBS news that it has Middle East terrorism written all over it” (Linenthal 2001: 18). Various terrorism “experts” were quoted in the media offering similar opinions such as the former CIA director William Webster. Talk radio shows were highly inflammatory in their language concerning the threat posed by Muslims. For example, the Bob Grant Show declared “we’re going to have more bombings, and we can’t stop it, because these people…it’s a violent religion” (Linenthal 2001: 18). There were a number of violent incidents directed against Muslim Americans around the country in the first few days after the bombing including physical assaults and vandalising of mosques (Linenthal 2001: 18).

Initially the government engaged in the form of impression management that Boin et al term “masking” (Boin et al. 2005: 87), ie, they were not revealing all operational details whilst they tried to ascertain the perpetrators. The only counter-frame offered was to warn that it was too early to blame Islamic terrorists. President Clinton (Clinton 2004: 651) and Oklahoma governor Frank Keating both issued public statements to this effect. These did little to dampen media enthusiasm for framing the crisis as the product of Islamic terrorism (Linenthal 2001: 19).

The framing debate around the crisis dramatically changed on 21 April, 1995, with the FBI arrest and charging of two white Americans (Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols) in connection with the bombing. The media then changed their framing of the crisis from it being the result of a conspiracy between Islamic terrorists to it arising from a conspiracy amongst the right-wing domestic militia movement (Fenster 1999: 228). McVeigh and Nichols were portrayed as reactionary terrorists operating in collusion with the militias who were considered to constitute a “post-Vietnam American Freikorps” (Linenthal 2001: 24). The Omaha World Herald claimed that the militias were “dark forces on the far edges of society….A tiny minority, still a lunatic fringe group” (Linenthal 2001: 24) Vogue characterised militia membership thus “In the best case scenario these guys vote for David Duke or buy ‘the truth about Waco’ videos at militia meetings: in the worst (Linenthal 2001: 24), you get guys holed up in the Ozarks with tanks plotting to overthrow the government and kill all the Jews” (Linenthal 2001: 25). Time magazine of 8 May, 1995, opined that the bombing happened at the “delusional margins” (Linenthal 2001: 20).

Statements from representatives of the movement assisted negative media framing of the militia movement. Although they strongly denied involvement in the bombing they damaged their credibility by also claiming that a governmental conspiracy was actually behind the bombing (Linenthal 2001: 25). Linda Thompson, of the Disorganized Militia of the U.S.A., stated, “I definitely believe the government did the bombing. I mean who’s got a track record of killing children?” (Hamilton 1996: 44) Frank Smith of the Georgia Militia commented “We expected them to do something drastic. We didn’t expect it to be that drastic” (Hamilton 1996: 44). Even more bizarrely Norm Olson, “Commander” of the Michigan Militia (the nation’s largest), asserted that the Japanese government had carried out the bombing in revenge for the American government carrying out the poison gas attack in Tokyo on March 20, 1995 (Fenster 1999: 28).

The revised media framing enhanced the crisis credibility of President Clinton. Credibility is recognised as a crucial factor in crisis communication (Boin et al 2005: 78). Clinton had enhanced his by offering a different message to the media coverage. He had warned that Muslim terrorists were not necessarily responsible at a time the media was framing them as the culprits. The subsequent arrest of McVeigh and Nicholls vindicated his counter-frame.

President Clinton’s adroit handling of crisis communication enabled him to transform his political fortunes. They were at their lowest ebb when the crisis hit. The 1994 congressional elections had led to the opposition conservative Republican party establishing firm majorities in both houses of the US Congress which left the Democratic President Clinton beleaguered and unpopular (Brinkley 1999: 1134). Rituals are a vital part of crisis communication (Boin et al 2005: 84) particularly for an American president. For example, Ronald Reagan’s presidential stature increased after his impressive handling of the role of “mourner-in-chief” (Walker 1996: 338) for the Challenger crew. When Clinton successfully assumed the same role at the national day of mourning in Oklahoma City on 23 April, 1995, his presidential stature was also enhanced (Walker 1996: 338). His subsequent public speeches and appearances were credited with offering further solace to a nation profoundly disturbed by the crisis (Clarke 2004: 97).

Having further bolstered his credibility by impressively carrying out his “sacerdotal duty” (Walker 1996: 338) Clinton was in a position to transform the framing into a “agenda-setting” crisis with a “frame-breaking” aspect (Boin et al 2005: 96). U.S. political dialogue had come to be dominated by right-wing anti-government rhetoric, much of it directed at Clinton. In its most virulent form it came from popular radio talkshow hosts such as Rush Limbaugh. Post-Oklahoma City much of this rhetoric now carried an ugly resonance. Republicans now found themselves wary of being associated with the radical right in the same way that Democrats had been concerned about the radical left in the 1970s (Walker 1996: 338). Clinton sought to expand his counter-frame in order to exploit this political opportunity. Notably, this would allow him to take the high moral ground in criticising his most fervent media opponents. In his words, “For the next few weeks, in addition to hammering away at those who condoned violence, I asked all Americans, including radio talk-show hosts, to weigh their words more carefully, to make sure they did not encourage violence…” (Clinton 2004: 654).

He succeeded in influencing the mainstream media. Harper’s posited that mainstream conservatism helped “legitimate the world view of the Oklahoma City bombers” (Linenthal 2001: 35). The New Yorker mused on 8 May, 1995, “The point…isn’t that Limbaugh or…caused the killing. It is that they never seemed to have given a moment’s thought, as they addressed their audiences, to the consequences of stuffing so much flammable resentment into such tiny bottles” (Linenthal 2001: 35). Later Clinton reflected with satisfaction, “The haters and extremists didn’t go away, but they were on the defensive and…would never quite regain the position they had enjoyed before Timothy McVeigh” (Clinton 2004: 654). Clinton’s skilled handling of the Oklahoma City crisis began his political comeback, which culminated in his landslide reelection victory in 1996 (Walker 1996: 338).

The “agenda-setting” crisis with a “frame-breaking” quality also had a legislative aspect. In March 1995 Clinton had submitted to Congress anti-terrorism legislation that included provision for one thousand additional federal staff, a new FBI counterterrorism operational centre, and legal approval for military experts to be involved in handling domestic terrorism issues (Clinton 2004: 651). It was designed as a government response to the World Trade Centre bombing of 1993. The legislation was controversial because it expanded federal surveillance powers and it generated intense debate (Linenthal 2001: 30). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was signed into law on 24 April, 1996, by Clinton. Its successful passage into law can be attributed to Oklahoma City serving as a symbol or risk and the need to combat the nation’s perceived vulnerability to terrorism. It had stalled in Congress up until that time and had looked unlikely to pass (Fenster 1999: 36).

The Oklahoma City bombing serves as an instructive example of crisis framing. In the confused, immediate aftermath of the attack erroneous expectations of the involvement of Islamic terrorists defined the frame of the event presented by domestic media. The modest counter-frame presented by government leaders, President Clinton and Governor Keating, questioning this assumption did not unduly influence media coverage. However, the subsequent arrest of McVeigh and Nicholls two days after the bombing fundamentally altered the framing of the crisis. The media framing changed to blaming American right-wing extremists. The framing of the government leader President Clinton also changed. With his credibility enhanced by his cautionary initial counter-frame and his performance as “mourner-in-chief” Clinton was able to reframe the crisis to criticise his political opponents and call for greater government resources to combat terrorism. The success of this strategy is reflected in much of the media adopting this approach and the Congressional passage of Clinton’s antiterrorism legislation. The ultimate
lesson of Oklahoma City seems to be that a crisis brought on by a terrorist event presents great political opportunities for leaders with the communication skills to frame it in accordance with their own agenda.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boin, A., t’Hart, P., Stern, E. and Sundelius, B. (2005), The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brinkley, A. (1999), American History: A Survey, Volume II: Since 1865, (tenth ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill College.

Clarke, R. (2004), Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, New York: Free Press.

Clinton, B. (2004), My Life, London: Hutchinson Books.

Fenster, M. (1999), Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, Minneapolis: The University of Minneapolis Press.

Hamilton, N. A. (1996), Militias in America: A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc.

Herbeck, D. and Michel, L. (2001), American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & The Oklahoma City Bombing, New York: Regan Books.

Linenthal, E. T. (2001), The Unfinished Bombing: Oklahoma City in American Memory, New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, D. (2006), ‘Crisis Management – Practice in Search of a Paradigm’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).

Walker, M. (1996), Clinton: The President They Deserve, London: Fourth Estate Limited.