According to Gelber and Vromen the “political is not only what is done by governments…it is also about the way power is distributed, negotiated and contested in all parts of our lives” (Gelber & Vromen 2005: 317). Drawing some impetus from this observation, if we accept that the division of state and society is an artificial construct, an argument can be readily constructed that crisis and disaster management is an inherently ‘political’ activity. However, this reductionist argument does not provide sufficient explanation of the ‘political’ nature of crisis and disaster management. In the interest therefore of securing a more expansive definition this paper will argue that there are three dominant paradigms that seek to define crisis and disaster management as a form of social construction.
The first paradigm is the dominant functionalist one of crisis and disaster management that presents it as a challenging part of effective governance. The second paradigm is that of the conspiracy theory. The third paradigm is that of the progressive. A critical examination of these paradigms will reveal that they all share a conception of crisis and disaster management being ‘political’, but differ markedly in the repercussions arising from this for the exercise of power. The assassination of President Kennedy, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina will prove of crucial importance in clarifying the respective differential focus of each of the paradigms I have identified.
Turning then to the functionalist paradigm for crisis and disaster management, what is at stake is the identification of ‘political’ activity that must be satisfactorily addressed in order to achieve sound governance. Although the exact definition of crisis and disaster management remains contested in the academy, there remains a broad agreement with respect to the latter that the field is defined by governmental and societal responses to ‘natural’ disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes (Boin 2005: 154). Crisis scholars have a broader field of interest encompassing the identification and official response to the belief that “the core values of a system…have come under threat. It is often assumed that such a threat requires the urgent reaction of leaders” (Boin 2006: 86). Scholars in this field recognise crisis and disaster management to be ‘political’. Boin et al assert “crises are political at heart” (Boin et al 2005: ix).
It can be inferred from Boin et al that this paradigm has a somewhat functionalist character in its emphasis upon system stability (Marshall 1998: 241). Accordingly the normative viewpoint adopted is that of the government and the strategies available to it in order to successfully manage crises and disasters. A key objective is for the state to avoid what Habermas terms a ‘legitimation crisis’, arising from the failure of governmental crisis management (Habermas 1973: 69). As I shall argue, this prioritisation of the reproduction of political power can be fruitfully contrasted with the emphasis on social change entailed by the other paradigms.
The normative character of the functionalist paradigm can be illustrated through consideration of pertinent operational examples. On 22 November 1963, US President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. This event was experienced as a severe national trauma with international repercussions (Brinkley 1999: 1033) requiring urgent and effective crisis management. Vice President Lyndon Johnson was swiftly installed as the new President. In order to minimise perceptions of Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination, which may have heightened international tensions, Johnson appointed a federal commission chaired by Chief Justice Warren to report on the assassination. The commission eventually concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was solely responsible. By individualising the threat to the American state in the form of a lone assassin, the functionalist paradigm could claim by its criterion to have averted a ‘legitimation crisis’ (Dallek 2004: 699).
Another traumatic event for the US was the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 resulting in the deaths of 3,000 people. Part of the governmental crisis management strategy was to request a report from a bipartisan national commission on the question of “how did this happen?”. The 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 detailed the intelligence and security failures that help make the attacks possible, and made extensive recommendations for policy changes aimed at preventing future attacks, notably in administrative, border and immigration policy. The report also attributed responsibility for the attacks to a plot amongst foreign Islamic terrorists (Wikipedia 2006). Under the terms of this paradigm, the commission report could be counted a successful governmental crisis response: witness the widespread acclaim with which it was greeted by not only sectional interests, such as politicians and the media (Boin et al 2005: 114), but also the general public. Many of its recommendations were adopted (Boin et al 2005: 115). It is not surprising then that much of the academic discourse on 9/11 has been framed in terms of the reporting of the commission.
Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in September 2005, was reported as the biggest ‘natural’ disaster in US history, resulting in more than 1500 deaths and nearly 1 million people being made homeless. However, unlike the assassination of President Kennedy and terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US governmental crisis management proved to be, as admitted by President Bush, “inadequate” (Gawenda 2006: 12). Katrina resulted in an ongoing ‘legitimation crisis’ for the Bush administration, with its competence being widely questioned. Consequentially, there has been a sharp decline in Bush’s popular approval. In terms of this disaster the functionalist paradigm has steadfastly focused on the failed emergency response and instrumentalist means for improving it in future (Gawenda 2006: 12).
Regarding the functionalist paradigm as seeking only to preserve its own interests at the expense of the greater good, its more populist opponents have chosen to disregard the imputed categorical separation between crisis and disaster (Smith, Denis 2006: 8). Attempting to indicate the conceptual incoherence that can result from this critical move, journalist Christopher Hitchens has characterised the conspiracy theory paradigm as “the white noise which moves in to fill the vacuity of the official version” (Hitchens 1993: 14 cited in Fenster 1999: xiv). By the same token, Hitchens would concede the possible identification of one overarching component: populist conspiracism is concerned with what it regards as the power of ruling elites over all aspects of political and social life. Hence, for conspiracy theorists the true nature of power (ie those controlling government) is hidden and only discernible by those aware of the conspiracy. Which is to say, power is most commonly explained by conspiracy theorists in terms of the secret control exercised by various social, ethnic or even supernatural elites in pursuit of their own nefarious ends (Fenster 1999: xiv). Conspiracism is critical of the existing political order and yearns for a new order based on (largely undefined) transparency and goodness (Fenster 1999: 225). In this regard, it might be said, along with Hitchens, that the paradigm fails to articulate an agenda for moving from plot detection to transformative political movement (Fenster 1999: 226).
It is demonstrably the case that under the conspiracy theory paradigm crisis and disaster management is a very different type of ‘political’ activity to that conceptualised in the functionalist paradigm. Typically crises and disasters are interpreted by conspiracy theorists for their ‘secret’ meaning, ie, what machinations of the power elite they reveal. Hence the representative examples selected for the functionalist paradigm serve equally well to illustrate that of the conspiracy theory.
Consider how speculation about the Kennedy assassination has come to embody the conspiracy theory paradigm in light of the fact that the majority of the American people have rejected the findings of the Warren Commission as demonstrated in opinion polling (Dallek 2004: 698). Conspiracy theories have nominated disparate elements from international (Cuba, Vietnam, the USSR) to the domestic (mafia, military industrial complex, Lyndon Johnson) as being behind the assassination (Dallek 2004: 699). Each of these theories have conceptualised the assassination as a ‘political’ act that involved the hidden play of power.
In spite of the wider credibility of the 9/11 Commission Report, conspiracy theories have vigorously sought to challenge its findings. In a complete inversion of the official enquiry, some conspiracists have maintained that the attacks were ‘facilitated’ by the Bush administration and government agencies. In some versions of this theory the ‘facilitation’ took the form of a deliberate failure by the administration to prevent them. In others the ‘facilitation’ involved the Bush administration actually planning and executing the attacks to further its own agenda (Griffin 2005: 5).
Amongst the African-American communities devastated by Hurricane Katrina, the governmental crisis disaster management response was conceptualised in far more sinister terms than “inadequate”. Conspiracy theories have gained wide currency by appealing to the sense of neglect and victimhood common to those most affected by this tragedy. They allege that government officials, in order to flood out black and poor neighbourhoods, deliberately smashed the levees. Lack of government progress in rebuilding these neighbourhoods is considered to be indicative of the continuing nature of the conspiracy (Gawenda 2006: 12).
The progressive paradigm articulates a radically differing version of crisis and disaster management as a ‘political’ activity to that offered by its populist relative. It does share with the conspiracy theory paradigm a critical attitude to the existing political order and a yearning for a better one. This paradigm also shares the critical attitude that crisis and disaster management is reflective of the interests of the power elites behind the state. However, what differentiates it from the conspiracy paradigm are three constitutive features. Firstly, its political analytical focus is upon institutional, structural or systemic phenomena, rather than the secretive machinations of elite individuals or groups (Fenster 1999: 57). Secondly, its epistemological approach is more rigorously scholarly in drawing upon verifiable documentation of the impact of institutional structures on political activity. Finally, its analysis is intended to lead to progressive political activity to deal with structural inequality, whereas conspiracy theorists engage in disempowering scapegoating of individuals (Fenster 1999: 58). How this paradigm differs from the other two is made apparent through consideration of its interpretation of the Kennedy assassination, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.
Conspiracy theories linking the assassination of President Kennedy with his perceived desire to pull out of Vietnam have been critically analysed by the dissident intellectual Noam Chomsky. Chomsky couches his argument in the terms of the progressive paradigm here identified:
“The available facts, as usual, lead us to seek the institutional sources of policy decisions and their stability…People who wish to understand and change the world will do well…to pay attention to it, not to engage in groundless speculation as to what one or another leader might have done” (Chomsky 1993: 38 cited in Fenster 1999: 57).
Chomsky points out that the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration was consistent with the Cold War policy pursued by his predecessors and successors (Chomsky 1993: 38 cited in Fenster 1999: 58). Under this paradigm the assassination of Kennedy was a ‘political’ act but effective systemic crisis and disaster management ensured it did not lead to radical systemic change.
Likewise Chomsky deploys a progressive argument concerning the events of 9/11: “A terrible atrocity, but unless you’re in Europe or the United States…you know it’s nothing new. That’s the way the imperial powers have treated the rest of the world for hundreds of years….If you’re interested in preventing them, of course you’ll pay attention to the reasons” (Chomsky 2003: 15). By this logic, effective crisis and disaster management would entail progressive, fundamental, change to American foreign policy and the interests it serves rather than what is proposed under either the functionalist or conspiracy theory paradigms.
The incompetence of the crisis and disaster management response to Katrina has been widely acknowledged. Under the functionalist paradigm this has tended to focus on criticism of the Bush administration and local authorities; criticism that for conspiracy theorists must be extended to include examination of ulterior motivations. Neil Smith distinguishes himself by articulating a progressive interpretation: “It is not a radical conclusion that the dimensions of the Katrina disaster owe in large part not just to the actions of this or that local or federal administration but the operation of a capitalist market more broadly, especially in its neo-liberal garb” (Smith, Neil 2006). He proposes that the victims should decide how ‘reconstruction’ proceeds in New Orleans and that the billions raised for disaster relief also rightfully belongs to them (Smith, Neil 2006). Systemic change to benefit the victims is central to this vision of crisis and disaster management as a ‘political’ activity.
Although crisis and disaster management can be understood as ‘political’ activity under each of the interpretive paradigms analysed here, I have argued in this paper that it is necessary to highlight the substantive political activity. Political activity is framed under the functionalist paradigm as a technical matter, in terms of what strategies are available to government and civil society to deal with systemic disruptions. The other two paradigms present an even more ‘political’ conception of crisis and disaster management in their focus upon the fundamental nature of power it reveals to them. The similarities though are somewhat deceptive. Whereas the conspiracy theory fails to articulate a sound critical strategy for analaysis or ultimate political action, the progressive perspective provides the most ‘political’ characterisation by insisting that crisis and disaster management has to be based upon critical, scholarly, structural analysis. Of paramount importance to a progressive perspective is finding ways of reconstructing the systemic inequities that lie behind crises and disasters. These differences should by now be apparent in light of the differing interpretations of the Kennedy assassination, 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina favoured by each of the three paradigms in question.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Boin, A., t’Hart, P., Stern, E. & Sundelius, B. (2005), The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boin, A. (2006), ‘Organizations and Crisis: The Emergence of a Research Paradigm’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).
Brinkley, A. (1999), American History A Survey Volume II: Since 1865, New York: McGraw-Hill College.
Chomsky, N. (1993), Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture, Boston: South End Press.
Chomsky, N. (2003), Power and Terror: Post-9/11 Talks and Interviews, New York: Seven Stories Press.
Dallek, R. (2004), John F. Kennedy: An Unfinished Life, London: Penguin.
Fenster, M. (1999), Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, Minneapolis: The University of Minneapolis Press.
Gawenda, M. (2006), ‘Katrina Goes To Washington’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 August 2006, p.12.
Gelber, K. & Vromen, A. (2005), Powerscape: Contemporary Australian Political Practice, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Griffin, D. R. (2005), The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, Northampton: Olive Branch Press.
Habermans, J. (1973), Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Press.
Hitchens, C. (1993), For the Sake of Argument, London: Verso.
Marshall, G. (1998), Dictionary of Sociology (second edn.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, D. (2006), ‘Crisis Management – Practice in Search of a Paradigm’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).
Smith, N. (2005), ‘There’s No Such Thing As A Natural Disaster’, Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social
Sciences, http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Smith/ , accessed 28 October, 2006.
Wikipedia (2006), ‘The 9/11 Commission Report’, Wikipedia online encyclopedia, http://www.wikipedia.com/, accessed 27 October, 2006.
The first paradigm is the dominant functionalist one of crisis and disaster management that presents it as a challenging part of effective governance. The second paradigm is that of the conspiracy theory. The third paradigm is that of the progressive. A critical examination of these paradigms will reveal that they all share a conception of crisis and disaster management being ‘political’, but differ markedly in the repercussions arising from this for the exercise of power. The assassination of President Kennedy, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina will prove of crucial importance in clarifying the respective differential focus of each of the paradigms I have identified.
Turning then to the functionalist paradigm for crisis and disaster management, what is at stake is the identification of ‘political’ activity that must be satisfactorily addressed in order to achieve sound governance. Although the exact definition of crisis and disaster management remains contested in the academy, there remains a broad agreement with respect to the latter that the field is defined by governmental and societal responses to ‘natural’ disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes (Boin 2005: 154). Crisis scholars have a broader field of interest encompassing the identification and official response to the belief that “the core values of a system…have come under threat. It is often assumed that such a threat requires the urgent reaction of leaders” (Boin 2006: 86). Scholars in this field recognise crisis and disaster management to be ‘political’. Boin et al assert “crises are political at heart” (Boin et al 2005: ix).
It can be inferred from Boin et al that this paradigm has a somewhat functionalist character in its emphasis upon system stability (Marshall 1998: 241). Accordingly the normative viewpoint adopted is that of the government and the strategies available to it in order to successfully manage crises and disasters. A key objective is for the state to avoid what Habermas terms a ‘legitimation crisis’, arising from the failure of governmental crisis management (Habermas 1973: 69). As I shall argue, this prioritisation of the reproduction of political power can be fruitfully contrasted with the emphasis on social change entailed by the other paradigms.
The normative character of the functionalist paradigm can be illustrated through consideration of pertinent operational examples. On 22 November 1963, US President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. This event was experienced as a severe national trauma with international repercussions (Brinkley 1999: 1033) requiring urgent and effective crisis management. Vice President Lyndon Johnson was swiftly installed as the new President. In order to minimise perceptions of Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination, which may have heightened international tensions, Johnson appointed a federal commission chaired by Chief Justice Warren to report on the assassination. The commission eventually concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was solely responsible. By individualising the threat to the American state in the form of a lone assassin, the functionalist paradigm could claim by its criterion to have averted a ‘legitimation crisis’ (Dallek 2004: 699).
Another traumatic event for the US was the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 resulting in the deaths of 3,000 people. Part of the governmental crisis management strategy was to request a report from a bipartisan national commission on the question of “how did this happen?”. The 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 detailed the intelligence and security failures that help make the attacks possible, and made extensive recommendations for policy changes aimed at preventing future attacks, notably in administrative, border and immigration policy. The report also attributed responsibility for the attacks to a plot amongst foreign Islamic terrorists (Wikipedia 2006). Under the terms of this paradigm, the commission report could be counted a successful governmental crisis response: witness the widespread acclaim with which it was greeted by not only sectional interests, such as politicians and the media (Boin et al 2005: 114), but also the general public. Many of its recommendations were adopted (Boin et al 2005: 115). It is not surprising then that much of the academic discourse on 9/11 has been framed in terms of the reporting of the commission.
Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in September 2005, was reported as the biggest ‘natural’ disaster in US history, resulting in more than 1500 deaths and nearly 1 million people being made homeless. However, unlike the assassination of President Kennedy and terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US governmental crisis management proved to be, as admitted by President Bush, “inadequate” (Gawenda 2006: 12). Katrina resulted in an ongoing ‘legitimation crisis’ for the Bush administration, with its competence being widely questioned. Consequentially, there has been a sharp decline in Bush’s popular approval. In terms of this disaster the functionalist paradigm has steadfastly focused on the failed emergency response and instrumentalist means for improving it in future (Gawenda 2006: 12).
Regarding the functionalist paradigm as seeking only to preserve its own interests at the expense of the greater good, its more populist opponents have chosen to disregard the imputed categorical separation between crisis and disaster (Smith, Denis 2006: 8). Attempting to indicate the conceptual incoherence that can result from this critical move, journalist Christopher Hitchens has characterised the conspiracy theory paradigm as “the white noise which moves in to fill the vacuity of the official version” (Hitchens 1993: 14 cited in Fenster 1999: xiv). By the same token, Hitchens would concede the possible identification of one overarching component: populist conspiracism is concerned with what it regards as the power of ruling elites over all aspects of political and social life. Hence, for conspiracy theorists the true nature of power (ie those controlling government) is hidden and only discernible by those aware of the conspiracy. Which is to say, power is most commonly explained by conspiracy theorists in terms of the secret control exercised by various social, ethnic or even supernatural elites in pursuit of their own nefarious ends (Fenster 1999: xiv). Conspiracism is critical of the existing political order and yearns for a new order based on (largely undefined) transparency and goodness (Fenster 1999: 225). In this regard, it might be said, along with Hitchens, that the paradigm fails to articulate an agenda for moving from plot detection to transformative political movement (Fenster 1999: 226).
It is demonstrably the case that under the conspiracy theory paradigm crisis and disaster management is a very different type of ‘political’ activity to that conceptualised in the functionalist paradigm. Typically crises and disasters are interpreted by conspiracy theorists for their ‘secret’ meaning, ie, what machinations of the power elite they reveal. Hence the representative examples selected for the functionalist paradigm serve equally well to illustrate that of the conspiracy theory.
Consider how speculation about the Kennedy assassination has come to embody the conspiracy theory paradigm in light of the fact that the majority of the American people have rejected the findings of the Warren Commission as demonstrated in opinion polling (Dallek 2004: 698). Conspiracy theories have nominated disparate elements from international (Cuba, Vietnam, the USSR) to the domestic (mafia, military industrial complex, Lyndon Johnson) as being behind the assassination (Dallek 2004: 699). Each of these theories have conceptualised the assassination as a ‘political’ act that involved the hidden play of power.
In spite of the wider credibility of the 9/11 Commission Report, conspiracy theories have vigorously sought to challenge its findings. In a complete inversion of the official enquiry, some conspiracists have maintained that the attacks were ‘facilitated’ by the Bush administration and government agencies. In some versions of this theory the ‘facilitation’ took the form of a deliberate failure by the administration to prevent them. In others the ‘facilitation’ involved the Bush administration actually planning and executing the attacks to further its own agenda (Griffin 2005: 5).
Amongst the African-American communities devastated by Hurricane Katrina, the governmental crisis disaster management response was conceptualised in far more sinister terms than “inadequate”. Conspiracy theories have gained wide currency by appealing to the sense of neglect and victimhood common to those most affected by this tragedy. They allege that government officials, in order to flood out black and poor neighbourhoods, deliberately smashed the levees. Lack of government progress in rebuilding these neighbourhoods is considered to be indicative of the continuing nature of the conspiracy (Gawenda 2006: 12).
The progressive paradigm articulates a radically differing version of crisis and disaster management as a ‘political’ activity to that offered by its populist relative. It does share with the conspiracy theory paradigm a critical attitude to the existing political order and a yearning for a better one. This paradigm also shares the critical attitude that crisis and disaster management is reflective of the interests of the power elites behind the state. However, what differentiates it from the conspiracy paradigm are three constitutive features. Firstly, its political analytical focus is upon institutional, structural or systemic phenomena, rather than the secretive machinations of elite individuals or groups (Fenster 1999: 57). Secondly, its epistemological approach is more rigorously scholarly in drawing upon verifiable documentation of the impact of institutional structures on political activity. Finally, its analysis is intended to lead to progressive political activity to deal with structural inequality, whereas conspiracy theorists engage in disempowering scapegoating of individuals (Fenster 1999: 58). How this paradigm differs from the other two is made apparent through consideration of its interpretation of the Kennedy assassination, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.
Conspiracy theories linking the assassination of President Kennedy with his perceived desire to pull out of Vietnam have been critically analysed by the dissident intellectual Noam Chomsky. Chomsky couches his argument in the terms of the progressive paradigm here identified:
“The available facts, as usual, lead us to seek the institutional sources of policy decisions and their stability…People who wish to understand and change the world will do well…to pay attention to it, not to engage in groundless speculation as to what one or another leader might have done” (Chomsky 1993: 38 cited in Fenster 1999: 57).
Chomsky points out that the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration was consistent with the Cold War policy pursued by his predecessors and successors (Chomsky 1993: 38 cited in Fenster 1999: 58). Under this paradigm the assassination of Kennedy was a ‘political’ act but effective systemic crisis and disaster management ensured it did not lead to radical systemic change.
Likewise Chomsky deploys a progressive argument concerning the events of 9/11: “A terrible atrocity, but unless you’re in Europe or the United States…you know it’s nothing new. That’s the way the imperial powers have treated the rest of the world for hundreds of years….If you’re interested in preventing them, of course you’ll pay attention to the reasons” (Chomsky 2003: 15). By this logic, effective crisis and disaster management would entail progressive, fundamental, change to American foreign policy and the interests it serves rather than what is proposed under either the functionalist or conspiracy theory paradigms.
The incompetence of the crisis and disaster management response to Katrina has been widely acknowledged. Under the functionalist paradigm this has tended to focus on criticism of the Bush administration and local authorities; criticism that for conspiracy theorists must be extended to include examination of ulterior motivations. Neil Smith distinguishes himself by articulating a progressive interpretation: “It is not a radical conclusion that the dimensions of the Katrina disaster owe in large part not just to the actions of this or that local or federal administration but the operation of a capitalist market more broadly, especially in its neo-liberal garb” (Smith, Neil 2006). He proposes that the victims should decide how ‘reconstruction’ proceeds in New Orleans and that the billions raised for disaster relief also rightfully belongs to them (Smith, Neil 2006). Systemic change to benefit the victims is central to this vision of crisis and disaster management as a ‘political’ activity.
Although crisis and disaster management can be understood as ‘political’ activity under each of the interpretive paradigms analysed here, I have argued in this paper that it is necessary to highlight the substantive political activity. Political activity is framed under the functionalist paradigm as a technical matter, in terms of what strategies are available to government and civil society to deal with systemic disruptions. The other two paradigms present an even more ‘political’ conception of crisis and disaster management in their focus upon the fundamental nature of power it reveals to them. The similarities though are somewhat deceptive. Whereas the conspiracy theory fails to articulate a sound critical strategy for analaysis or ultimate political action, the progressive perspective provides the most ‘political’ characterisation by insisting that crisis and disaster management has to be based upon critical, scholarly, structural analysis. Of paramount importance to a progressive perspective is finding ways of reconstructing the systemic inequities that lie behind crises and disasters. These differences should by now be apparent in light of the differing interpretations of the Kennedy assassination, 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina favoured by each of the three paradigms in question.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Boin, A., t’Hart, P., Stern, E. & Sundelius, B. (2005), The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boin, A. (2006), ‘Organizations and Crisis: The Emergence of a Research Paradigm’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).
Brinkley, A. (1999), American History A Survey Volume II: Since 1865, New York: McGraw-Hill College.
Chomsky, N. (1993), Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political Culture, Boston: South End Press.
Chomsky, N. (2003), Power and Terror: Post-9/11 Talks and Interviews, New York: Seven Stories Press.
Dallek, R. (2004), John F. Kennedy: An Unfinished Life, London: Penguin.
Fenster, M. (1999), Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, Minneapolis: The University of Minneapolis Press.
Gawenda, M. (2006), ‘Katrina Goes To Washington’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 August 2006, p.12.
Gelber, K. & Vromen, A. (2005), Powerscape: Contemporary Australian Political Practice, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Griffin, D. R. (2005), The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, Northampton: Olive Branch Press.
Habermans, J. (1973), Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Press.
Hitchens, C. (1993), For the Sake of Argument, London: Verso.
Marshall, G. (1998), Dictionary of Sociology (second edn.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, D. (2006), ‘Crisis Management – Practice in Search of a Paradigm’, in D. Elliott and D. Smith (eds.) Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Basingstoke: Routledge (2006).
Smith, N. (2005), ‘There’s No Such Thing As A Natural Disaster’, Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social
Sciences, http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Smith/ , accessed 28 October, 2006.
Wikipedia (2006), ‘The 9/11 Commission Report’, Wikipedia online encyclopedia, http://www.wikipedia.com/, accessed 27 October, 2006.
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